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From Goss To Bishop: The Demise
of the Entitlement Doctrine
INTRODUCTION
This comment reviews the recent procedural due process
cases1 decided by the United States Supreme Court. The pur-
pose of this comment is to develop a paradigm, consistent with
the entire body of due process case law, which will assist attor-
neys attempting to determine whether a particular right or ben-
efit is protected by the due process clause of either the fifth or
fourteenth amendment. 2
The Court has explicitly recognized that constitutionally pro-
tected property interests are not contained in any narrowly
defined class.3 It is apparent that those interests in liberty which
are similarly entitled to due process protection are not any more
susceptible to a precise definition. 4 It is not surprising therefore,
that the vague and dynamic parameters of protected interests
do not lend themselves to a single comprehensive approach.
Accordingly, the analysis of recent due process cases resulted in
the development of three separate models which are herein
proposed.
The scope of this article is limited to the question of whether a
particular right or benefit is afforded protection by the due
process clause.5 The discussion does not extend to the issue of
1. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
2. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. . ." U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, § 1, V.
3. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) "We have made clear...
that 'property' interests subject to procedural due process protection are not
limited by a few rigid, technical forms."
4. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 n.11 (1972).
5. This discussion will address the development of Court recognition of
state created rights as protected entitlements, the subsequent license afforded
states to so define such interests as to limit the protection to which they are
entitled, or to preclude their attainment of a protected status, and the method
for determining when and if a state created interest is protected by procedural
due process requirements. The discussion will then address the concurrent
development of two additional theories upon which may be premised a claim
that an interest is entitled to procedural due process protection. One theory
whether there is sufficient state action to invoke the due process
clause; nor does it address the question of what level of protec-
tion is required once it is determined that an interest is protect-
ed.6 Furthermore, although the due process clause applies
equally to deprivations of life, liberty, or property,7 cases involv-
ing deprivation of life are so unique as to require a separate
review of the issues attendant to the less severe taking of liberty
and property. Thus, deprivation of life is not addressed in this
comment.
It is clearly established that "property interests protected by
procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of
real estate, chattels, or money. ' ' 8 Similarly, constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests are not limited to the "formal constraints
imposed by criminal process." 9 It is with these expanded
concepts of property and liberty that this comment is concern-
ed, not with the more precisely defined and traditional interests
which pose little problem in their identification.1 0
STATE CREATION OF RIGHTS
The Development of State Created Property Rights
In two companion cases, Board of Regents v. Roth1 and Per-
recognizes that two interests may cumulatively comprise a sufficient expecta-
tion to justify due process protection even though each interest alone would not
be entitled to such protection. The other theory, which rests heavily upon equit-
able considerations, allows the provision of due process protection when no
practical alternative protection exists and the result, absent due process protec-
tion, reflects a basic lack of fairness. The discussion of these additional theories
also includes a method for determining when such interests suffice to achieve a
protected status thereby invoking the constitutional protections of procedural
due process.
6. For additional comment see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.
PENN, L. REV. 1267 (1975).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. 408 U.S. at 571-572.
9. Id. at 572.
10. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 207 n.2 (1974), "Society today is
built around entitlement [and m]any of the most important of these entitlements
now flow from government .... Such sources of security ... are no longer
regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully
deserved, and in no sense a form of charity." Quoting from Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255
(1965). Some interests are obviously protected. Fee simple ownership in realty
acquired through a legal conveyance, freedom from physical incarceration, and
similar interests will certainly require procedural due process prior to any state
deprivation of such interests. In such cases the inquiry is normally concerned
with the existence of state action and the level of due process required, the
sufficiency of the interest to invoke such protection being tacitly presumed.
11. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth was a non-tenured state university teacher
hired for a one-year probationary period, after which he was dismissed without
prior notice or opportunity for a hearing. The Court held that unless Roth could
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ry v. Sindermann12, the Court announced a broad standard to
be employed in determining whether a claim to a particular
benefit is sufficient to create a protected property interest. Ex-
panding the concept of property interests to include more than
full ownership, the Court explained:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it .... Property interests, of course, are not created
by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those bene-
fits. 13
This broad standard opens procedural due process to a
plethora of benefits which do not fit traditional concepts of
property interests. In Roth, the Court found governmental em-
ployment not to be a protected property interest as there was no
"state statute . . .that secured [the employee's] interest in re-
employment or that created any legitimate claim to it."'1 4 In a
reference to Goldberg v. Kelly 15, the Court elaborated on the
declaration that such claims of entitlement may be attributable
to state law 16, explaining:
Thus, the welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, had a claim
establish a vested "property" interest in continued employment, or an im-
plicated liberty interest in his reputation, procedural safeguards would not be
required.
12. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Sindermann was also a non-tenured teacher but had
previously taught in the state system for ten years. The Court held that de facto
tenure existed which created a property right in his continued employment and
thus he was entitled to procedural safeguards upon his dismissal.
13. 408 U.S. at 577.
14. Id. at 578.
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court held that persons receiving welfare bene-
fits had an interest in continued receipt of those benefits, and such interest was
entitled to due process protection.
16. Perhaps the divergent results reach in Roth and Goldberg may be
partially ascribed to a fundamental distinction between welfare and employ-
ment. In regard to welfare, most individuals who are qualified to receive such
payments do, in fact, receive them. In contrast, governmental employment is not
available for all, or even most of those who may be qualified. The refusal to
provide due process protection to employment interests may therefore result, at
worst, in providing that same position to another who is equally qualified to
hold it. Deprival of such an interest results in no greater number of people
without the benefit, but only a shifting of scarce interests among different
members of society. Although this is of little solace to the individual who is
discharged, the commensurate benefit to some other equally deserving indi-
vidual tends to ameliorate any aspect of inequity inhering to the deprival of due
process protection.
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of entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute
defining eligibility for them. . . . Just as the welfare recipients "prop-
erty" interest in welfare payments was created and defined by statu-
tory terms, so the respondent's "property" interest in employment...
was created and defined by the terms of his appointment. 17
The Court found great significance in the fact that the state
had made no provision for renewal of Roth's employment
contract. The opinion impliedly indicated that such provision
might have to be conditioned on an absence of "sufficient
cause"'18 not to renew. This is not to say, however, that all state
created entitlements need be explicitly supportive of a legiti-
mate expectation, as the decision in Perry v. Sindermann found
an implied promise by the state that the employee had a valid
expectation of continued employment.'9
The propensity of the broad standard established in Roth and
Sindermann to application in a wide variety of situations was
quickly evidenced in subsequent decisions. In Bell v. Burson20
the Court held that there is an entitlement to a driver's license
which was granted by state law and, therefore, the state must
afford due process of law before a deprivation can be effected.
Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez21 the Court found that Ohio law
created a right to attend school and an act of suspension in-
volved a denial of that right sufficient to invoke due process
protection.22
Thus, the state, which must afford due process, has the broad
capability of creating those very interests which are protected,23
this power existing in a wide variety of contexts including
contractual, 24 statutory,25 and regulatry.26
17. 408 U.S. at 577.
18. Id. at 578. It would appear that even at this early date the court en-
visioned a need for some affirmative guarantee by the state before a protected
interest would be created'
19. 408 U.S. 593., The implication arose from the state's de facto tenure
program which supported the employee's expectation of continued employ-
ment.
20. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Bell held a valid Georgia driver's license and was
involved in an automobile accident. The law required an immediate suspension
of his license because he had no liability insurance but did not provide for any
procedural due process.
21. 419 U.S. 565 (1615).
22. Id. at 574-75.
23. It is often said, in a variety of situations, that the power to create is the
power to destroy. Theapplicability of such a statement to the due process issue
is discussed later.
24. 408 U.S. 593; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), and Codd v.
Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 631 (1977)'(Stevens dissenting). An employee has a claim of
entitlement or a property, interest if by virtue of a contract, or an applicable
regulation or a statute, he could. only be dismissed for cause.
25. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
26. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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The Development of State Created Liberty Rights
The expansion of protected interests beyond traditional
concepts into various areas of state created entitlements was
not restrained to property, but grew in a parallel fashion in the
area of liberty interests also entitled to due process protection.
In Wolff v. McDonnell27 the Court found a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in statutorily created "good time credit"
to convicts. 28 This recognition of a liberty interest within the
meaning of the due process clause was expressly noted to be
analogous to the method of determining a protected property
interest.29 Also commensurate with the holdings in Roth,0 the
Court implied a need for some affirmative guarantee of this
entitlement by placing significance on the fact that the interest
here could only be forfeited by serious misconduct. 3
1
In Morrissey v. Brewer32 the Court's identification of a pro-
tected liberty interest evinced still more similarity to the devel-
opment of property interests. In determining that a parolee's
interest in continued parole was entitled to procedural due pro-
cess, the Court found a state guarantee that this expectation
was legitimate as the state had implicitly promised that revoca-
tion of parole was conditioned on a failure to adhere to the
requirements of parole. 33
It would appear therefore, that the opportunity for newly
developing rights to ascend to the level of constitutionally pro-
tected entitlements is no less applicable to liberty interests than
to property interests. Furthermore, although not premised upon
any constitutional guarantees, explicit or implicit, "[a] person's
liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a
statutory creation of the state. 31 4
27. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
28. Id. at 556-57. The Court found that where a state provided a statutory
right to good time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison, and when the
statute specified that such credit is to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior,
such credit was a protected liberty interest entitled to due process.
29. Id. at 557.
30. 408 U.S. 564. See also note 18.
31. 418 U.S. at 557.
32. 408 U.S. 471 (1972), where a parolee was returned to prison for parole
violation, without a hearing.
33. Id. at 482.
34. 418 U.S. at 558.
Refining and Restricting the Theory of State Created Rights:
The Power to Create is the Power to Limit
If Goldberg and its progeny35 served to initiate a prolific ex-
pansion of the purview of procedural due process protections so
as to include any entitlement secured by an "independent
source", one might ask what limitations remain. Although there
must be 'a "legitimate claim of entitlement"36 to a benefit, and
more than an "abstract need" for, or "unilateral expectation" of
such benefit, such criteria conceivably encompasses a remark-
able spectrum of interests suddenly entitled to due process pro-
tection.
However, as recent cases illustrate, 3 the concern need not be
for any drastic over-extension of the requirement to afford due
process, as the power to create a protected entitlement has
proven to be a double-edged sword. As one commentator has
asked, 38 "What would happen if the state carefully tailored its
statute to negate any inference that it was conferring a property
right ... ?,,39
This question was first reached in Arnett v. Kennedy,40 where
the Court construed the Lloyd-Lafollett Act 41 as creating a pro-
35. Perry v. Sindermann, supra note 12; Board of Regents v. Roth, supra
note 11; Bell v. Burson, supra note 20; Goss v. Lopez, supra note 21; Wolff v.
McDonell, supra note 27; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra note 32.
36. 408 U.S. at 577.
37. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
38. Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974
DUKE L.J. 89 (1974).
39. Still another consideration was raised by Friendly, supra, note 6, at
1276. "It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure
of limited resources, that at some point the benefit to the individuals from an
additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such
protection, and that the expense of protecting those likely to be found undeserv-
ing will probably come out of the pockets of the deserving." In light of these
practical considerations, one might expect the development of a floor, below
which a benefit is considered too insignificant an interest to compel due process
protections. Roth specifically rejects this approach and finds the balancing test
an erroneous standard by which to determine whether a property interest exist-
ed. See 408 U.S. at 571 n. 8. "The Constitutional requirement of opportunity for
some kind of hearing before deprivation of a protected interest, of course does
not depend on such a narrow balancing process."
40. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Kennedy, a non-probationary federal employee, was
discharged after being notified of certain administrative charges upon which
the dismissal was based. In that notice he was advised of his rights under Civil
Service regulations to reply to the charges and to 'review the material upon
which the notice was based. Kennedy refused to respond to the charges directly,
asserting instead, that the charges were unlawful in the absence of a pre-
termination, trial-type hearing.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
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tected interest by statute.42 Three Justices, in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, held that the elaborate statute created a pro-
cedural system which did not violate due process despite its
comparative insufficiency by constitutional procedural stand-
ards.4 3 The plurality refused to read any constitutional proce-
dure guarantees into the statute, admitting that Kennedy did
have a statutory expectancy, but noting that the very statute
which gave him that right "expressly provided also for the pro-
cedure by which 'cause' was to be determined, and expressly
omitted the procedural guarantees which appellee insists are
mandated by the Constitution."44 The inescapable conclusion is
that legislatures, while creating a protected right on one hand,
can limit procedural protections which accompany the right on
the other.4 5 The question was not, however, resolved by Arnett,
as six remaining Justices refused to accept this theory.
46
42. As the case involved a federal employee and federal statute, the inde-
pendent source creating a property right was federal and not state law and the
relevant constitutional provision was the fifth and not the fourteenth amend-
ment.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) provides: "An individual... may be removed only for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Subsection (b) sets out
the administrative procedures under which a civil servant may challenge his
removal as being without cause. Subsection (a) was the basis of the petitioner's
claim of a property interest. Although Justice Rehnquist found that the proce-
dures afforded Kennedy were sufficient, Justice Marshall, in his dissent
(concurred in by Justices Douglas and Brennan), found them woefully insuffi-
cient by the constitutional standards delineated in Morrissey and Goldberg.
Specifically, Justice Marshall attacked the provisions of the Act which left it to
the discretion of the hearing officer whether the discharged employee may have
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses and present favorable wit-
nesses on his own behalf; and which did not require the hearing officer to be a
disinterested and impartial individual. (Such a disinterested decision-maker
was provided but only at a time long after the discharge; See 416 U.S. at 217, n.
13).
44. 416 U.S. at 152.
45. Id. "[W]e decline to conclude that the substantive right may be viewed
wholly apart from the procedure provided for its enforcement .... [ITlheprop-
erty interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the
procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest." Id. at
155. " . .. [Where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining
that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the
sweet." Id. at 153-54.46. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, while viewing the procedures
for termination provided by Congress as constitutionally permissible, took ex-
ception to the principal expressed by the plurality: "The plurality would thus
conclude that the statute governing federal employment determines not only the
nature of appellee's property interest, but also the extent of the procedural
(Vol. 5: 523, 1978]
The question was clearly answered in Bishop v. Wood, 47
where the Court adopted and expanded the holding which was
specifically rejected by the majority of Justices in Arnett. In
Bishop, the petitioner challenged the termination of his employ-
ment as there was no pre-termination hearing, despite his clas-
sification as a permanent employee.48 The Court, citing local
ordinances and state law 49 as construed by state courts, held
that Bishop had no right to expect continued employment.50
protections to which he may lay claim .... This view misconceives the origin of
the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred not by legislative
grace, but by constitutional guarantee." Id., at 166-67. It seems that the view of
the other six members was, that while a state may define what is and what is not
property, once having defined those rights the constitution defines due process
(White J. concurring), Id. at 185.
47. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). The petitioner, a policeman, was discharged from
employment by the City Manager upon the recommendation of the Chief of
Police. The petitioner was told privately that his dismissal was due to a failure to
obey orders and poor attendance at police training sessions, among other rea-
sons. The petitioner claimed that his status as a permanent employee afforded
him a constitutional right to a pretermination hearing as his permanent classifi-
cation gave him a sufficient expectation of continued employment to constitute
a protected property interest under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
48. This would appear to distinguish his position from that of Roth who was
non-tenured and more closely align him with Perry who was tenured, albeit
implicitly. See notes 11 and 12 supra. See also Buhr v. Buffalo Public School
District, 509 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1974). Tenure or non-probationary status may
give rise to an entitlement.
49. Two laws were of particular importance to the Court's decision in
Bishop. The first was a local ordinance which is set out at 426 U.S. at 344, n.5.
Under this ordinance a discharged employee is entitled to a written notice
setting out reasons for his dismissal and the effective date if he so requests. By
its very nature this is essentially an ex post facto notice, coming as it does only
after discharge and request. Additionally, at 345, n. 9, the Court notes that under
North Carolina law, unless a contract provides otherwise, an employment
contract which contains no provisions for duration or termination is terminable
at the will of either party, irrespective of the performance of either party. This
same ex post facto nature also inheres to the procedures provided in Fuentes
and De Chem, infra, note 102 et seq.
50. The Court concluded that the ordinance on its face could be fairly read
to confer a claim of entitlement. If it had adopted this view, the procedural due
process clause would have guaranteed a hearing to determine the cause of his
discharge. Instead, the Court adopted without analysis the district court's opin-
ion which concluded that under the local ordinance the petitioner held his
position at the "will and pleasure of the city"; reasoning that a judge from the
area was better situated to construe a local statute than an appellate court. It is
curious that the Court felt bound to accept the district court's interpretation of
state law, since the ordinance had never been construed by a state court. This is
particularly questionable when viewed in light of the fact that without such a
decision, the Court could have justifiably resolved the issue in a different man-
ner. This approach is disturbing for it shows a reluctance by the Court to define
and apply constitutional principles. Whether a property interest is created may
be a matter of state law (see Roth, supra,) but the Court should make the final
determination on whether that interest merits constitutional protection.
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The Court distinguished Bishop from Arnett, as in the latter
case the statute provided that the employee could only be dis-
charged for cause, thereby giving him a property interest enti-
tled to protection. In Bishop, however, the employee had no
protected interest since, as a matter of state law, he "held his
position at the will and the pleasure of the city. ' '51 Of particular
significance though, is the fact that even had the state law been
constructed so as to provide a protected interest, the determina-
tion of such an interest would still be predicated on state law
and the power of definition would nonetheless reside in state
hands.
In this case, whether we accept or reject the construction of the ordi-
nance adopted by the two lower courts, the power to change or clarify
that ordinance will remain in the hands of the City Council of Marin.52
The Court allowed that a protected interest could derive from
ordinance or implied contract but held that in either case "the
sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by refer-
ence to state law. ' 5 3
... [An enforceable expectation of continued public employment...
can exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, has actually
granted some form of guarantee .... Whether such a guarantee has
been given can be determined only by an examination of the particu-
lar statute or ordinance in question. 54
The concept, incipient in Roth and Perry, found clear expres-
sion in Bishop; a state created benefit does not acquire the
attributes of a protected interest absent some form of guaran-
tee. The guarantee required, of course, is that the expectation of
continued enjoyment of the benefit is justified; and, the mes-
sage of Bishop is clear that it must be found in the state law
which created the benefit. This should come as no surprise for
as previously noted, as early as Roth51 and Wolfr6 the Court
required some state confirmation of such an expectation,
whether expressed or implied, in the statute creating the right.
One possible explanation is the evolving deference the Court has shown
toward local construction of state laws. See Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion in Roth at 593 and his dissent in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 439 (1971).
51. 426 U.S. at 345 n.8.
52. Id. at 349 n.14.
53. Id. at 344.
54. Id. at 345.
55. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also note 18, supra.
56. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See also note 19, supra.
The rule in Bishop found equal application to the determina-
tion of liberty rights. In Meachum v. Fano57 the Court held that a
prisoner had no protected liberty interest in his desire to avoid
transfer to a different prison with greater restraints and less
desirable conditions because no such interest had been created
by state law.58 The standard delineated in Bishop was clearly
applied to an asserted liberty interest in Meachum and the re-
sult was the same.5 9 The determination of a protected interest
was premised on an examination of state law in order to reveal
the existence of a guarantee; and as none was found, the interest
failed to achieve a protected status. °
The Deteryminaton of a State Created Right: Model #1
The first model proposed is based on the aforementioned
principles that a property or liberty interest created by state law
must include some affirmative guarantee that the interest sup-
ports a legitimate claim of entitlement; and that same law may
so define the right as to proscribe the provision of any due
process in excess of procedures afforded by the creating statute
57. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
58. Id. at 226-27.
59. Although the Court applied the Bishop standard to a liberty interest it
should be obvious that the analogy is imperfect. The Bishop standard will not,
or at least should not, lend itself to as wide a range of applications in the area of
liberty interests as it does to property interests. Unlike property interests, cer-
tain liberty rights are not only fundamental, but are expressly recognized in the
Constitution. It is doubtful that the Court would allow a State to engage in any
such self-determination of restraints in regards to deprivations of certain types
of liberty rights. It would be unjustifiably speculative to anticipate to what
extent the Court will apply this standard to expectations of liberty, other than to
assert that it will find some application in the right circumstances.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens found even a limited application to
liberty to be inappropriate.
"The Court indicates that a 'liberty interest' may have either of two sources.
According to the Court, a liberty interest may 'originate in the Constitution,'
ante at 226, or it may have 'its roots in state law.' Ibid. Apart from those two
possible origins, the Court is unable to find that a person has a constitutionally
protected interest in liberty.
"If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct. But
neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty
which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions
are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the
citizen. The relevant state laws either create property rights, or they curtail the
freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is
essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex soci-
ety. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source.
"I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator
with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom
which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or
privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations." 427 U.S. at 230.
60. See also Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1977).
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itself. Therefore, in order to constitute a constitutionally pro-
tected interest the following three questions must, as applied to
the interest in question, be answered in the affirmative.
1) Has the interest been created or recognized by state law?
2) Has that law provided some form of assurance that an
expectation of continued enjoyment of the particular benefit is
justified?
3) Is there an absence of provisions affording specified pro-
cedures for termination of the benefit which fall short of proce-
dures afforded by the procedural due process clause?
Problems Attendant to State Created Rights
Although this first model reflects current law as propounded
in Bishop, it serves to demonstrate a serious deficiency in the
existing policy. The basic fallacy of conditioning the availability
of due process protection on law is the obvious fact that such
protection exists only under such terms as the sovereign deems
proper. The very entity sought to be restrained by the constitu-
tion is now enabled to determine for itself when and if those
restraints will have effect. There is nothing in the Court's rea-
soning which prevents the sovereign from defining entitlements
so as to emasculate the procedural due process clause.61
There is, however, a less harsh interpretation of Bishop, al-
though the end result is no less debilitating. It is possible that the
issue was seen by the Court not as a deprivation of any interest,
but rather as a determination of the nature of an interest which
is given. By way of analogy, the lessor, in terminating a periodic
tenancy, does not deprive the lessee of any vested right, but
merely exercises a predetermined, albeit flexible, boundary of
the estate originally granted. It is not a taking of something
already owned but only appears as such since the process of
defining what has been given may continue well past the initial
vesting of an interest and not be completed until the interest has
expired; not by any externally initiated deprivation, but by vir-
tue of inherent limitations inextricably impressed on that inter-
est at its inception. The confusion is attributable to the fact that
61. For California's approach to this problem see Skely v. State Personnel
Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1975).
with traditional rights the state normally operates as a third
party. However, more recently recognized entitlements find the
state as both the grantor and the entity constitutionally re-
strained in any efforts to deprive some interest. Although this
interpretation may be somewhat less repugnant to traditional
concepts of due process, it suffers from an uncomfortable simi-
larity to the previous distinction between rights and privileges, a
distinction rejected by the Court.62
CUMULATIVE VESTING
Two Unprotected Interests May Combine to Equal A Protected
Right
Concurrent with the development of the principle that pro-
tected entitlements may be created, defined and limited by state
law, a second development occurred and the resulting concept
may prove to represent an alternative to the harsh limitations of
the first model.
It was long held that an interest in reputation or the right to a
good name was a protected liberty interest. "Where a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity
to be heard are essential. ' 63 Likewise, due process rights would
attach where the state has imposed a "stigma or other disability
that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employ-
ment.,
6 4
From these statements one might conclude that either harm to
reputation or foreclosure of employment is actionable under the
62. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481-82; Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at
262; where the Court had "rejected the wooden distinction between rights and
privileges." See also Bishop v. Wood (Brennen, J., dissenting) 426 U.S. at 353,
n.4: "By holding that States have 'unfettered discretion' in defining 'property'
for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, . . . the
Court is, as my Brother White argues, effectively adopting the analysis rejected
by a majority of the Court in Arnett v. Kennedy .... More basically, the Court's
approach is a resurrection of the discredited rights/privileges distinction, for a
State may now avoid all due process safeguards attendant upon the loss of even
the necessities of life ... merely by labeling them as not constituting 'proper-
ty., "'
Basically, the rights/privileges doctrine was predicated on a distinction be-
tween interests founded in the Constitution, whether expressed or implied,
which were "rights," and therefore impervious to any state impingement; and
interests created by the state, which were "privileges," and therefore subject to
impingement by the state without recourse.
63. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
64. 408 U.S. at 573.
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due process clause. Indeed, for some time this was considered
an accurate representation of the law.65 However, as previously
discussed, neither interest would currently be entitled to protec-
tion absent sufficient state law endorsement. It is not surprising
then, that in Paul v. Davis66 the Court rejected the contention
that "stigma to one's reputation is somehow different in kind
from infliction by a state official of harm to other interests
protected by state law. ' 67 In so doing, however, the Court's
discussion of earlier cases produced a previously undetected
pattern of distinguishing between protected and unprotected
interests; a pattern which serves as the foundation for the sec-
ond model proposed.
In Paul the respondent was included on a list of "Active
Shoplifters. '' 68 However, although he had been arrested, the
charges had been dropped, so he was never called on to stand
trial.
In explaining the basis for holding that this injury did not
constitute a deprivation of liberty, the Court turned to several
prior decisions. The Court interpreted United States v. Lovett 69
as requiring due process protections because the act of depriva-
tion in that case, not only "stigmatized [the employees'] reputa-
tion", but also prohibited "their ever holding a government
job.,, 70
65. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 365
U.S. 886 (1961); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975); and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
66. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist.
67. Id. at 701. The clear implication being that the previous understanding
that harm to reputation was sufficient to invoke due process protection must
now give way to the requirements that any liberty interest, including one related
to reputation, must be recognized by state law with requisite guarantees.
68. 424 U.S. at 695. At the top of each page was a mug shot and a statement
addressed "To: Business Men in the Metropolitan Area. The Chiefs of Police of
the Jefferson County and City of Louisville Police Department in an effort to
keep their officers advised on shoplifting activity, have approved the attached
alphabetically arranged flyer of subjects known to be active in this criminal
field. This flyer is being distributed to you, the business man so that you may
inform your security personnel to watch for these subjects. There persons have
been arrested during 1971 and 1972 or have been active in various criminal fields
in high density areas".
69. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
70. 424 U.S. at 702.
The Paul opinion, in referring to Joint Antifascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, a plurality decision,71 pointed out:
( . . [A]t least six of the eight Justices who participated in that case
viewed any "stigma" imposed by official action of the Attorney Gener-
al of the United States, divorced from its effect on the legal status of
an organization or a person, such as loss of tax exemption or loss of
government employment, as an insufficient basis for invoking the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.7 2
In discussing Wieman v. Updegraff3 , the Court noted a dual
concern in that case as it involved both a "'badge of infamy'
which might arise from being branded disloyal by the govern-
ment" and "[a resulting loss of] teaching positions at a state
university. '7
4
Paul also cites with emphasis from Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy.75 In that opinion, the Court stated: "Finally it is noted
that this is not a case where government action has operated to
bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with attendant foreclo-
sure of other employment opportunities. '76
The majority concludes with an unexpected explanation of
this line of cases stating that mere defamation absent accom-
71. The Court never reached the petitioner's due process claim; it held that
the Attorney General had exceeded his authority granted by executive order to
brand organizations as subversive.
72. 424 U.S. at 704-05. Also, it should be noted that petitioners had alleged
violation of their constitutional rights by a federal official and, therefore, had
sought to invoke the fifth amendment's due process guarantee. Interestingly,
though the court failed to mention it, later cases relying on Joint Anti-Fascist
(including the lower court in Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180 (6 Cir. 1974)), have
quoted Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion which in part states: "The
right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind
even though it may not involve the stigma or hardship of criminal conviction is a
principal basic to our society .... " 341 U.S. at 168. Justice Jackson in his
concurrence also made the point that although the Attorney General might have
a legal right to brand these people as subversives, this does not mean that he
could do it illegally, i.e., without affording them procedural due process. 341
U.S. at 185.
73. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
74. 424 U.S. at 705. Note that the Wieman Court actually decided on other
grounds. It is not the decision in Wieman which is of real interest here, but
rather the Paul Court's eager effort to interpret its dicta in a specific manner.
Under attack in that case was an Oklahoma statute requiring state employees to
take a loyalty oath. The oath included, inter alia a vow that the employee had
not been a member of any organization listed as subversive. The Court found
the statute unconstitutional as violating due process proscriptions against arbi-
trariness.
75. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). This case involved a government employee dismis-
sed from her job for security reasons.
76. 424 U.S. at 705. But it is apparent that the majority in Cafeteria Workers
did not recognize that employment foreclosure was a precondition for a protect-
ed liberty interest. The fact that no other employment was foreclosed bolstered
their argument that no stigma attached, but was not essential to that holding.
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panying loss of employment was insufficient to invoke pro-
cedural due process guarantees.
77
Two things appear from the line of cases beginning with Lovett.
The Court has recognized the serious damage that could be inflicted
by branding a government employee as "disloyal," and thereby stig-
matizing his good name. But the Court has never held that the mere
defamation of an individual, whether by branding him disloyal or
otherwise, was sufficient to invoke the guarantees of procedural due
process absent an accompanying loss of government employment.
78
The opinion in Paul then turns to a second line of cases which
had seemed to hold that reputation was a protected liberty inter-
est. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,79 pursuant to a state statute,
the local police chief could post the names of individuals who
exhibited certain traits, such as exposing his family to want or
becoming dangerous to the community. Having been "posted"
an individual was prohibited from purchasing alcoholic bever-
ages. Such "posting" was done without prior notice or an oppor-
tunity to be heard. While the court recognized that it was
constitutionally within the power of the state to pass the ordi-
nance, the court stated:
Where a persons's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential." 80
The Paul opinion recognized this could be taken to mean that
if a governmental official defames a person, without more, the
procedural requirements of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment are brought into play. The Court, however,
interpreted the governmental action as more than harm to
Constantineau's reputation. The government was also denying
him the right to purchase liquor, a right extended to all other
77. 424 U.S. at 706 n. 4. The Court relegates to a footnote a discussion of
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969). In that case there were no accom-
panying employment interests. It involved the constitutionality of the Louisiana
Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry which was empowered to be used
and was allegedly used to find named individuals guilty of violating criminal'
laws and to brand them as criminals in public. This case seems to illustrate that
when the state makes accusations even though it does not directly deprive an
individual of liberty (i.e., freedom from bodily restraint) an accusation of
wrongdoing is enough to bring due process into play. This seems to be the same
issue in Paul, and it is strange that it did not merit much attention from the
majority.
78. Id. at 706.
79. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). This was the primary case the lower court relied on.
80. Id. at 437. See also Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
citizens. This denial was the deprivation which invoked the pro-
tection of the due process clause."
The Paul majority's analysis was next directed at Roth 82 and
Goss.83 Both of these cases were decided after Constantineau.
In each of these cases the Court took judicial notice of a relevant
liberty interest in reputation. After holding that Roth had no
entitlement to continued employment, the Court then stated
that though there are cases where a person has no property
interest, he may be afforded due process protection where his
liberty interests would be implicated. 84 Justice Rehnquist re-
fused to take this to mean that harm to reputation alone would
be an actionable denial of due process however. He used Roth
as support for his position that harm to reputation must occur in
conjunction with the loss of a more tangible interest, such as
loss of governmental employment or, as in Constantineau, loss
of the right to purchase liquor, for there to be a denial of due
process.
The Goss Court found an independent liberty interest in repu-
tation with respect to "the students' standing with their fellow
pupils and their teachers as well as ... later opportunities for
higher education and employment. '85 Here, again, the Paul ma-
jority interpreted Goss as meaning that for an actionable due
process claim the harm to reputation must occur simultaneous-
ly with the deprivation of a property interest; here, the right to
public education.
As additional support for the contention that all due process
rights, be they liberty or property, attain constitutional protec-
tion by virtue of the fact that they were initially recognized and
protected by state law the Court cited Bell86 and Morrissey v.
81. 424 U.S. at 708. But query, in light of Bishop, did Constantineau have
any statutory right to drink, since his entitlement to that right ended when the
police chief made his determination that he was dangerous to the community?
See also Bishop v. Wood 426 U.S. at 349, truth or falsity neither enhances nor
diminishes his constitutional interest in liberty. But see Codd v. Velger 429 U.S.
624 (1977). Petitioner must first allege falsity before a stigma can attach.
82. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
83. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
84. 408 U.S. at 573. "[The State] ... did not base its nonrenewal of his
contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty or
immorality. Had it done so, this would be a different case .... In such a case,
due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University
officials .... [H]owever, there is no suggestion whatever that respondent's
interests in his 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity' is at stake." (footnote
omitted).
85. 419 U.S. at 575.
86. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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Brewer.87 In these cases, as in others discussed, "as a result of
the state action complained of, a right or status previously re-
cognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished. '88
In Bell the right altered was the right to operate a vehicle on the
highways of the state, while in Morrissey it was the right to
remain at liberty as long as the conditions of his parol were not
violated. 89
The Court in Bishop reaffirmed the new position it had an-
nounced in Paul. In addition to his property claim, Bishop al-
leged a deprivation of liberty because his dismissal was partly
based on charges that he had caused low morale and was in-
volved in conduct unsuited to an officer. Since this harm to
reputation accompanied a deprivation of a governmental job, it
appears to be the type of liberty interest that would merit pro-
tection. However, the Court rejected his claim, holding that no
interest in liberty was infringed because there had been "no
public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge." 90 Read to-
gether, Paul and Bishop indicate that loss of employment based
on stigmatizing allegations which the employee had no opportu-
nity to refute, coupled with some kind of public disclosure of the
allegations will constitute a deprivation of liberty proscribed by
the due process clause.
In Collaizzi v. Walker;9 1 the court of appeals for the 7th Cir-
87. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
88. 424 U.S. at 711.
89. This is a rather confusing portion of the opinion as it seems to imply that
harm to reputation must be coupled with a property interest already entitled to
protection. In such a case the protection of procedural due process would
already be afforded by the Constitution and there would be little need for an
accompanying deprivation of one's reputation in order to invoke such protec-
tion. This confusion finds resolution when this portion of the discussion is read
together with Bishop. When both opinions are read in their entirety this portion
appears to be merely a reaffirmation of the principle that individually both
property and liberty interests must find their legitimazation in state law, and
does not necessarily refute the contention that together such interests may
individually be insufficient yet cumulatively suffice to invoke due process pro-
tections. See note 91, infra.
90. 426 U.S. at 348. The dissent, however, noted that although no disclosure
had been made, it was inevitable that public disclosure would occur when
Petitioner sought further employment; prospective employers would no doubt
make inquiries concerning the reason for his dismissal. Id., at 352. At any rate,
public disclosure would appear to be an essential ingredient to any cumulatively
vested interest entitled to due process protection which depended upon harm to
reputation as one of the interests involved.
91. 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976). The Court found a violation of procedural
cuit applied the Paul rationale to a situation involving precisely
this dual deprivation of both property and liberty interests. The
opinion produced a clear articulation of the principle espoused
in Paul.
In other words, infliction of a stigma to reputation accompanied by a
failure to rehire (or, a fortiori, by a discharge) states a claim for
deprivation of liberty without due process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this combination of stigma plus
failure to rehire/ discharge states a claim even if the failure to rehire
or discharge of itself deprives the plaintiff of no property interest
within the meaning of the 'Fourteenth Amendment. We reach this
conclusion because on the facts of Roth itself the Supreme Court
found that the plaintiff respondent had no claim of entitlement to, or
property interest in his job. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701.
Since the Court in Paul v. Davis specifically approved the Roth dic-
tum concerning stigma to reputation, it follows that stigma to reputa-
tion (not itself a deprivation of liberty as defined in the Fourteenth
Amendment) plus failure to rehire or discharge (not necessarily in-
volving deprivation of property as defined in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) may nevertheless when found in conjunction state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. 41983 for deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest without due process.
92
Apparently, the combination of two or more interests, each
alone insufficient to achieve the status of a protected entitle-
ment, may cumulatively comprise a substantial enough expec-
tation so as to constitute a constitutionally protected interest in
property or liberty. Admittedly, this principle has only seen
expression in the context of a stigma to reputation along with
loss of employment.
However, there appear to be no characteristics inhering to the
rationale which would necessarily preclude its application to
other types of liberty and property interests,93 or indeed, even to
two interests of the same type.9 4
The Determination of a Cumulatively Vested Interest:
Model #2
The second model proposed is predicated on the discussion in
due process had occurred where former state employees had been discharged
with an accompanying press release which impugned their character, and
where no hearings had been provided. See also Cox v. Northern Virginia
Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d 555 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d
908 (10th Cir. 1977).
92. 542 F.2d at 973.
93. The extensive recapitulation of prior holdings viewed in a new light fell,
unfortunately, somewhat short of comprising a complete and coherent underly-
ing rationale. The discussion in Paul is conclusionary and supportive rationale
must be implied. A not totally unjustified presumption might be that the Paul
Court has ignored the precept of Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 and has looked not
to the "nature" but to the "weight" of the cumulative interests at stake.
94. E.g., two separate property interests or, conversely, two separate liberty
interests.
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Paul as applied in Colaizzi, and as such represents an alterna-
tive to the first model, affording a second opportunity to estab-
lish a protected interest should the expectations fail to meet the
criteria of the first model. Therefore, in order to invoke
constitutional levels of procedural due process, the following
three questions must, as applied to the interests in question, be
answered in the affirmative:
1) Are there two separate claims of entitlements at stake?
2) Has each interest failed to ascend to the level of a protect-
ed entitlement as determined by Model 41?
3) Would each interest have sufficed to acquire a protected
status by pre-Bishop and Paul standards?
For the less adventurous, the following two questions should
be added to the model:95
4) Was one interest an expectation of continued employ-
ment which lacked only a guarantee by the state?
5) Was the other interest a liberty expectation that one's re-
putation would not be publicly stigmatized?
PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
The Development of An Additional Possibility for Invoking
Procedural Due Process Protection
Both models discussed to this point reflect doctrines contain-
ing fundamental infirmities which might prove precipitous in
view of the recognized proclivity of any sovereign to oppressive
tendencies. The first allows the state, which, as noted, is becom-
ing the primary source of property rights, to draft its laws so as
to negate the intended protections of the procedural due process
clause. The second affords an alternative extremely limited in
its potential application. 6 In response to this inadequacy in
95. Affirmative answers to these two questions will place the case squarely
on point with the factual contexts of Bishop, Paul and Collaizzi. The applicabil-
ity of this model can, therefore, be argued with greater certainty.
96. Indeed, were a property interest limited so as to deny state recognition
or guarantee and also expressly provided with termination procedures short of
Constitutional mandates, even the addition of public disrepute might fail to
invoke due process protection.
what is construed to be the current state of the law, a third
model is herein proposed. This model is submitted as a possible
interpretation of the recent cases already discussed, and, al-
though it is not necessarily as accurate a representation of cur-
rent due process doctrine as the first two analyses, it is certainly
more in accord with traditional concepts97 of procedural due
process.
In Goldberg, welfare recipients challenged denial of welfare
benefits without a pretermination hearing, while in Arnett98 the
due process challenge came from a public employee who was
dismissed without a hearing. Concurring in the Arnett plurality
decision, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, differ-
entiated Arnett from Goldberg.9 9 In Arnett, if the decision to
terminate was found at a later date to be erroneous, Kennedy
would be reinstated and awarded back pay. His actual injury
would consist only of temporary interruption of his income.
Justice Powell then stated:
To be sure, even a temporary interruption of income could constitute
a serious loss in many instances. But the possible deprivation is con-
siderably less severe than involved in Goldberg . . .where termina-
tion ... would have occurred in the face of "brutal need." (Citation
omitted) Indeed,... "the crucial factor in this context-a factor not
present in the case of... the discharged government employee...-
is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
elibigility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits."100
The contrast can thus be stated, that in effect, the Goldberg
petitioners were without legal or practical remedy, if the four-
teenth amendment were not invoked. There was no place else to
look to for assistance other than the state in overcoming their
temporary hardship. Arnett on the other hand, had practical
remedies available, for the public employee may well have inde-
pendent resources to overcome any temporary hardship and he
may be able to secure a job in the private sector. Alternatively,
he will be eligible for welfare benefits. 10 1
97. E.g., that the state cannot entirely sidestep the fourteenth amendment
merely by careful drafting of its laws. Some interests will invariably invoke
constitutional protections regardless of state efforts to evade the restraints
imposed upon it by the Constitution.
98. Similar challenges were made in Bishop and Roth.
99. In Goldberg a right to a pretermination hearing was found to exist
while in Arnett it was not.
100. 416 U.S. at 169.
101. Id. The practical alternative theory would deny all people claiming a
deprivation of government employment a due process interest, by the fact that
they could seek other employment. Indeed, with the exception of Perry, the
court has never granted a hearing when the deprivation claimed was govern-
mental employment.
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A comparison of Fuentes v. Shevin'0 2 and North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di Chem, Inc.' with Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant'° 4 yields a similar result. In these cases pre-judgment
attachments were challenged as denials of due process. Fuentes
and Di Chem held such attachments did violate the due process
clause. Mitchell reaches a different result, citing among its rea-
sons, 10 5 the availability of swift judicial review if a party elects
to challenge, 0 6 a feature not available in the statute considered
in Fuentes.10 7 Here the contrast is again apparent. In Fuentes
and Di Chem the state provided no adequate remedy for the
debtor to re-obtain possession of his property. In Di Chem the
Court remarked, "Indeed, it would appear that without the fil-
ing of a bond the defendant debtor's challenge to the garnish-
ment will not be entertained whatever the grounds may be.'
10 8
In Mitchell, on the other hand, the statute required that there be
an immediate remedy available.10 9
In the majority opinion in Paul, the Court found that the state
had not created any right, but that it had simply provided a tort
remedy."10 The Court felt that allowing Davis's claim would
convert every defamation by a public official into an action
under 42 U.S.C. §1983."' It seemed to place a great emphasis on
102. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
103. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
104. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
105. See 416 U.S. at 625-26. Another reason given; in Fuentes a clerk could
issue the attachment order while in Mitchell only a judge could authorize
attachment.
106. Id. at 616. The Louisiana law provides for judicial control from begin-
ning to end. See also North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601,
607 (1975) where the Court compares both Fuentes and Mitchell to invalidate a
Georgia attachment statute. The Court states: "There is no early hearing at
which the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause for
the garnishment." See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
107. Id. at 616. In Fuentes two statutes were considered. The Florida statute
provided that the defendant would "eventually" have an opportunity for a
hearing, as the defendant in the trial court action for repossession. The Pennsyl-
vania statute was essentially the same but it did not require that there ever be an
opportunity for a hearing on the merits.
108. 419 U.S. at 607.
109. Though these cases involve a discussion on how much process is due,
they fit into the model, for if the state could actually tailor its statute as the first
model asserts then there would be no claim of entitlement after the writ of
attachment is filed and, hence, no property interest.
110. 424 U.S. at 712.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who under color of any
statute, . . . causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
this fact, implying that the existence of a state remedy might
somehow affect plaintiff's federal cause of action."2
Justice Brennan in his dissent, indicated that this was the
relevant fact relied upon by the majority and, citing Monroe v.
Pape,113 he asserts:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The federal remedy is supplemental to the state remedy, and
the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked.114
In Perry v. Sindermann"5 the same concept emerged, albeit
in an almost imperceptible manner. The determination that Sin-
dermann's interest in employment was a protected property
interest relied on an implied promise of continued employment
which was found to exist in a de facto tenure program. In mak-
ing this inference the Court noted that "Odessa College has no
tenure system.""l 6 The language of this portion of the opinion
portrayed a concern that, unlike the employee in Roth" 7 who
had access to a system of tenure but had failed to qualify for it,
the employee in Perry could rely on no employment security
absent the provision of due process protection.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 118, the Court found Wis-
consin garnishment procedures to be violative of procedural
due process requirements. The protected interest involved was
a property right in the use of the garnished portion of wages.
The Court demonstrated a clear concern for the alternative
available to injured persons if this property right were not af-
forded the protection of due process.
For a poor man-and who ever heard of the wage of the affluent
being attached?-to lose part of his salary often means his family will
go without the essentials. No man sits by while his family goes hungry
or without heat. He either files for consumer bankruptcy and tries to
begin again, or just quits his job and goes on relief. Where is the
equity, the common sense, in such a process?" 9
If there were any doubt that the basis of this decision was the
lack of an effective alternative remedy, the dissent by Justice
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress."
112. 424 U.S. at 698-701.
113. 365 U.S. 167, 182 (1961) where an illegal search and seizure by police
which was actionable under state trespass laws, was also found to be actionable
under 1983 as a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
114. 424 U.S. at 715.
115. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
116. Id. at 600.
117. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
118. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
119. Id. at 342 n.9.
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Black did not notice it. His dissenting opinion stressed his belief
that available remedies were not only sufficient in this case, but
an improper basis for determining the existence of a protected
interest.12 0
In light of these cases, one can reconcile all the due process
decisions by stating that the court is willing to invoke procedur-
al protections whenever the state deprives a person of a benefit
and no practical or legal remedy exists. In Arnett, practical
alternatives are available through a new job, savings, or wel-
fare. The same is true in Roth and in Bishop. In Mitchell a legal
remedy existed to challenge the attachment and, just as in Paul,
the individual could resort to the state courts.
121
As pointed out in Goldberg, there was no viable alternative,
nor was there in Fuentes. The Plaintiffs in Goss had no other
means to obtain an education in light of their suspension.122 In
Bell there was no legal means for petitioners to drive. 23 In
Morrissey a resort to practical non-judicial relief would only
make the individual's position worse. 124
The Determination of a Protected Interest Arising from the
lack of a Practical Alternative Remedy: Model #3
The third model presented is premised on the principle that a
significant interest in liberty or property will suffice to invoke
procedural due process protections should the failure to afford
it that status result in an absence of any practical alternative
remedies, notwithstanding its lack of state recognition or
guarantee and despite the absence of any additional interest
which might produce a cumulatively justifiable entitlement.
Therefore, to constitute a Constitutionally protected interest,
the following three questions, as applied to that interest, must
be answered in the affirmative:
1) Has a significant interest in liberty or property failed to
qualify for a protected status as determined by Models 1 and 2?
120. Id. at 346.
121. Beyond the scope of this paper is the question left unanswered in Paul.
If the sole remedy for determination by the state is the front action will it not be
barred by the privilege held by state officials?
122. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
123. 402 U.S. 535 (1975).
124. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2) Does that interest depend entirely upon the status, as a
protected entitlement, for its protection?
3) Is there a complete absence of any practical alternative
remedy should the interest be deprived?
125
While recognizing that this model is based on an interpreta-
tion which had not been expressly recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, it would appear to have a greater
constitutional validity than the first model proposed. It would
deny the states any right to deny procedural protections to de-
privation of benefits for which no alternative remedy is avail-
able. The model does not address the question of how complete
the lack of alternatives must be. Given the present composition
of the Court, however, there may have to be a substantial lack of
alternatives. By couching the due process threshold as a matter
of alternatives, a desirable degree of flexibility on the issue of
completeness of deprivation will exist. This flexibility, while not
as great as with a balancing test, would improve the chances of
a litigant who may otherwise be barred from relief.
In conclusion, it is submitted that this third model, wherein a
litigant argues his only relief lies in the due process clause,
offers some opportunities to avoid the pitfalls of Roth, Bishop
and Paul. This is particularly true when linked to the policy
considerations 126 which lead one to reject the principles reflect-
ed in the first two models.
SCOTT H. RACINE
STEPHEN J. SPINELLO
125. Although questions #2 and *3 appear similar they are substantially
different in approach. Question #2 addresses a lack of opportunities to protect
the particular interest in question. Question #3 addresses a lack of remedy to
compensate for injuries sustained when the interest is deprived. Even though no
procedures exist to prevent unjust termination of a job (thereby satisfying
question *2) adequate unemployment insurance may obviate the need to pro-
tect the interest through provision of due process (thereby failing question *3).
126. E.g., the undesirability of allowing the entity sought to be restrained by
the Constitution to determine for itself when and if those restraints will be given
effect. See the earlier discussion following the first model, in text accompanying
notes 61 and 62.
